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Abstract
In this paper a proof system is developed for plan verification prob-
lems {X}c{Y } and {X}c{KWp} under 0-approximation semantics for
AK . Here, for a plan c, two sets X,Y of fluent literals, and a literal
p, {X}c{Y } (resp. {X}c{KWp}) means that all literals of Y become
true (resp. p becomes known) after executing c in any initial state in
which all literals in X are true. Then, soundness and completeness
are proved. The proof system allows verifying plans and generating
plans as well.
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1 Introduction
Planning refers to the procedure of finding a sequence of actions(i.e., a plan)
which leads a possible world from an initial state to a goal. In the early days
∗Corresponding author. Tel: 0086-20-84114036, Fax:0086-20-84110298.
†This research was partially supported by the NSFC project under grant number:
60970040 and a MOE project under grant number: 05JJD72040122.
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of Artificial Intelligence(AI), an agent(i.e., plan generator or executor) was
assumed to have complete knowledge about the world but it turned out to be
unrealistic. Therefore, planning under incomplete knowledge earns a lot of
attention since late 1990s [15, 6, 22, 10, 19, 17]. A widely accepted solution
is to equip the planner with actions for producing knowledge, also called
sensing actions, and allow to use conditional plan[10, 24, 25, 23, 16], i.e.,
plans containing conditional expressions (e.g., If -Then-Else structures).
Consider the following example [24], say a bomb can only be safely defused
if its alarm is switched off. Flipping the switch causes the alarm off if it is
on and vice versa. At the beginning we only know the bomb is not disarmed
and not exploded, however, we do not know whether or not the alarm is on,
i.e., the knowledge about initial state of the domain is incomplete. An agent
could correctly defuse the bomb by performing the conditional plan c below:
check; If alarm off Then defuse Else {switch; defuse}
in which check is a sensing action that produces the knowledge about the
alarm. It is necessary to mention that there exists no feasible classical plans
for this scenario, e.g., neither defuse nor switch; defuse could safely disarm
the bomb.
To describe and reason about domains with incomplete knowledge, a
number of logical frameworks were proposed in the literature. One of well-
established formalizations is the action language AK [24, 4]. In contrast to
its first order antecedents [15, 22], AK possesses a natural syntax and a tran-
sition function based semantics, both together provides a flexible mechanism
to model the change of an agent’s knowledge in a simplified Kripke structure.
In [24] the authors propose several semantics for AK , all of which, roughly
speaking, are based on some transition function from pairs of actions and
initial states to states. For convenience we use SB-semantics to denote the
semantics based on the transition function which maps pairs of actions and
c-states to c-states. Here, a c-state is a pair of a world state and a knowledge
state which is a set of world states. One of the results in [4] is that the
polynomial plan existence problem under SB-semantics is PSPACE-complete.
Even we restrict the number of fluents determined by a sensing action, the
existence of polynomial plan with limited number sensing actions is ΣP2 -
complete [4]. To overcome the high complexity, Baral and Son [24] have
proposed i-approximations, i = 0, 1, · · · . It has been proved in [4] that
under some restricted conditions polynomial plan existence problem under
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0-approximation is NP-complete, that is, it is still intractable because it is
widely believed that there is no polynomial algorithm solving an NP-complete
problem.
Although modern planers are quite successful to produce and verify short
plans they still face a great challenge to generate longer plans. There have
been many efforts to construct transformations from planning or plan verifica-
tion to other logic formalisms, for example, first-order logic (FOL) [11, 9, 24],
propositional satisfiability (SAT) [20], QBF satisfiability (QSAT), [18, 14],
non-monotonic logics [7, 3, 13], and so on. These approaches provide ways to
use existing solvers for planning and plan verification, they do not, however,
tell us how to generate and verify new plans from old ones.
It is well known that programming is generally also very hard, however,
proof system for program verification allows one to construct new correct
programs from shorter ones [1]. Similarly, proof systems for plan verification
would be helpful for verifying and constructing longer correct plans.
For a given domain description D, two sets X, Y of fluent literals, and
a plan c, we consider the verification problem of determining whether D |=
{X}c{Y }, that is, whether all literals of Y becomes true after executing c in
any initial state in which all literals of X are true. It seems natural that from
D |= {X}c1{Y } and D |= {Y }c2{Z} we should obtain D |= {X}c1; c2{Z}.
That is,
{X}c1{Y }, {Y }c2{Z}
{X}c1; c2{Z}
should be a valid rule. This paper is devoted to develop a sound and complete
proof system for plan verification under 0-approximation.
One important observation is that constructing proof sequences could also
be considered as a procedure for generating plans. This feature is very useful
for the agent to do so-called off-line planning [12, 5]. That is, when the agent
is free from assigned tasks, she could continuously compute (short) proofs and
store them into a well-maintained database. Such a database consists of a
huge number of proofs of the form {X}c{Y } after certain amount of time.
W.l.o.g., we may assume these proofs are stored into a graph, where {X},
{Y } are nodes and c is an connecting edge. With such a database, the agent
could do on-line query quickly. Precisely speaking, asking whether a plan c′
exists for leading state {X ′} to {Y ′}, is equivalent to look for a path c′ from
{X ′} to {Y ′} in the graph. This is known as the PATH problem and could
be easily computed (NL-complete, see [21]).
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we mainly recall the
language of AK and the 0-approximation semantics. In addition, a few new
lemmas are proved, which will be used in later sections. Section 3 is devoted
to the construction of proof system. Soundness and completeness are proved.
Section 4 concludes this paper.
2 The Language AK
The languageAK [24] proposed by Baral & Son is a well known framework for
reasoning about sensing actions and conditional planning. In this section we
recall the syntax and the 0-approximation semantics of AK , in addition we
prove several new properties (e.g. the monotonicity of 0-transition function,
see Lemma 2.1 below) which will be used in next section.
2.1 Syntax of AK
Two disjoint non-empty sets of symbols, called fluent names (or fluents) and
action names (or actions) are introduced as the alphabet of the language
AK . A fluent literal is either a fluent f or its negation ¬f . For a fluent f ,
by ¬¬f we mean f . For a fluent literal p, we define fln(p) := f if p is a fluent
f or is ¬f . Given a set X of fluent literals, ¬X is defined as {¬p | p ∈ X},
and fln(X) is defined as {fln(p) | p ∈ X}.
The language AK uses four kinds propositions for describing a domain.
An initial-knowledge proposition (which is called v-proposition in [24]) is
an expression of the form
initially p (1)
where p is a fluent literal. Roughly speaking, the above proposition says that
p is initially known to be true.
An effect proposition (ef-proposition for short) is an expression of the form
a casues p if p1, · · · , pn (2)
where a is an action and p, p1, · · · , pn are fluent literals. We say p and
{p1, · · · , pn} are the effect and the precondition of the proposition, respec-
tively. The intuitive meaning of the above proposition is that p is guaranteed
to be true after the execution of action a in any state of the world where
p1, · · · , pn are true. If the precondition is empty then we drop the if part
and simply say: a causes p.
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An executability proposition (ex-proposition for short) is an expression of
the form
executable a if p1, · · · , pn (3)
where a is an action and p1, · · · , pn are fluent literals. Intuitively, it says that
the action a is executable whenever p1, · · · , pn are true. For convenience, we
call {p1, · · · , pn} the ex-preconditions of the proposition.
A knowledge proposition (k-proposition for short) is of the form
a determines f (4)
where a is an action and f is a fluent. Intuitively, the above proposition says
that after a is executed the agent will know whether f is true or false.
A proposition is either an initial-knowledge proposition, or an ef-proposition,
or an ex-proposition, or a k-proposition. Two initial-knowledge propositions
initially f and initially g are called contradictory if f = ¬g. Two effect
propositions “a causes f if p1, · · · , pn” and “a causes g if q1, · · · , qm” are
called contradictory if f = ¬g and {p1, · · · , pn} ∩ {¬q1, · · · ,¬qm} is empty.
Definition 2.1 ([24]) A domain description in AK is a set of propositions
D which does not contain
(1) contradictory initial-knowledge propositions,
(2) contradictory ef-propositions
Actions occurring in knowledge propositions are called sensing actions,
while actions occurring in effect propositions are called non-sensing actions.
In this paper we request that for any domain description D the set of sensing
actions in D and the set of non-sensing actions in D should be disjoint.
Definition 2.2 (Conditional Plan [24]) A conditional plan is inductively
defined as follows:
1. The empty sequence of actions, denoted by [ ], is a conditional plan;
2. If a is an action then a is a conditional plan;
3. If c1 and c2 are conditional plans then the combination c1; c2 is a con-
ditional plan;
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4. If c1, · · · , cn (n ≥ 1) are conditional plans and ϕ1, · · · , ϕn are conjunc-
tions of fluent literals (which are mutually exclusive but not necessarily
exhaustive) then the following is a conditional plan (also called a case
plan):
case ϕ1 → c1. · · · . ϕn → cn. endcase
5. Nothing else is a conditional plan.
Propositions are used to describe a domain, whereas queries are used to
ask questions about the domain. For a plan c, a set X of fluent literals, and
a fluent literal p, we have two kinds of queries:
Knows X after c (5)
Kwhether p after c (6)
Intuitively, query of the form (5) asks whether all literals in X will be known
to be true after executing c, while query of the form (6) asks whether p will
be either known to be true or known to be false after executing c.
2.2 0-Approximation Semantics
In this section we arbitrarily fix a domain description D without contradic-
tory propositions. From now on when we speak of fluent names and action
names we mean that they occur in propositions of D.
According to [24], an a-state is a pair (T, F ) of two disjoint sets of fluent
names. A fluent f is true (resp. false) in (T, F ) if f ∈ T (resp. f ∈ F ).
Dually, ¬f is true (resp. false) if f is false (resp. true). For a fluent name
f outside T ∪ F , both f and ¬f are unknown. A fluent literal p is called
possibly true if it is not false (i.e., true or unknown). In the following we often
use σ, δ to denote a-states. For a set X = {p1, · · · , pm} of fluent literals, we
say X is true in an a-state σ if and only if every pi is true in σ, i = 1, · · · , m.
An action a is said to be 0-executable in an a-state σ if there exists an
ex-proposition executable a if p1, · · · , pn, such that p1, · · · , pn are true in
σ. The following notations were introduced in [24].
(1) e+a (σ) := {f | f is a fluent and there exists “a causes f if p1, · · · , pn”
in D such that p1, · · · , pn are true in σ}.
(2) e−a (σ) := {f | f is a fluent and there exists “a causes ¬f if p1, · · · , pn”
in D such that p1, · · · , pn are true in σ}.
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(3) F+a (σ) := {f | f is a fluent and there exists “a causes f if p1, · · · , pn”
in D such that p1, · · · , pn possibly true in σ}.
(4) F−a (σ) := {f | f is a fluent and there exists “a causes ¬f if p1, · · · , pn”
in D such that p1, · · · , pn are possible true in σ}.
(5) K(a) := {f | f is a fluent and “a determines f” is in D}.
For an a-sate σ = (T, F ) and a non-sensing action a 0-executable in σ, the
result after executing a is defined as
Res0(a, σ) := ((T ∪ e
+
a (σ)) \ F
−
a (σ), (F ∪ e
−
a (σ)) \ F
+
a (σ))
The extension order  on a-states is defined as follows [24]:
(T1, F1)  (T2, F2) if and only if T1 ⊆ T2, F1 ⊆ F2.
Please note that if (T1, F1)  (T2, F2) then for a fluent literal p we have
• if p is true (resp. false) in (T1, F1) then p is true (resp. false) in (T2, F2),
• if p is unknown in (T2, F2) then p must be unknown in (T1, F1), and
• if p is possibly true in (T2, F2) then p is possibly true in (T1, F1).
Consequently, for any non-sensing action a and a-states σ1 and σ2 such that
σ1  σ2 and a is 0-executable in σ1, we have
• a is 0-executable in σ2.
• e+a (σ1) ⊆ e
+
a (σ2), and e
−
a (σ1) ⊆ e
−
a (σ2).
• F+a (σ2) ⊆ F
+
a (σ1), and F
−
a (σ2) ⊆ F
−
a (σ1).
Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 For any non-sensing action a and a-states σ1 and σ2 such
that σ1  σ2 and a is 0-executable in σ1, we have
Res0(a, σ1)  Res0(a, σ2).
The 0-transition function Φ0 of D is defined as follows [24].
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• If a is not 0-executable in σ, then Φ0(a, σ) := {⊥}.
• If a is 0-executable in σ and a is a non-sensing action, Φ0(a, σ) :=
{Res0(a, σ)}.
• If a is 0-executable in σ = (T, F ) and a is a sensing action, then
Φ0(a, σ) := {(T
′, F ′) | (T, F )  (T ′, F ′) and T ′ ∪ F ′ = T ∪ F ∪K(a)}.
• Φ0(a,Σ) :=
⋃
σ∈Σ Φ0(a, σ).
Let Σ1,Σ2 be two sets of a-states, we write Σ1  Σ2 if for every a-state δ
in Σ2, there is an a-state σ in Σ1 such that σ  δ.
The next proposition follows directly from Proposition 2.1. and the defi-
nition of Φ0(a, σ) above.
Proposition 2.2 Suppose σ1  σ2 and a is an action 0-executable in σ1,
then Φ0(a, σ1)  Φ0(a, σ2).
The extended 0-transition function Φ̂0, which maps pairs of conditional
plans and a-states into sets of a-states, is defined inductively as follows.
Definition 2.3 ([24])
Φ̂0([ ], σ) := {σ}
Φ̂0(a, σ) := Φ0(a, σ)
When c is a case plan case ϕ1 → c1. · · · . ϕk → ck. endcase,
Φ̂0(c, σ) :=
{
Φ̂0(cj, σ), if ϕj is true in σ,
{⊥}, if non of ϕ1, · · · , ϕk is true in σ.
Φ̂0(c1; c2, σ) :=
⋃
σ′∈Φ̂0(c1,σ)
Φ̂0(c2, σ
′)
Φ̂0(c,⊥) := {⊥}.
Φ̂0(c,Σ) :=
⋃
σ∈Σ Φ̂0(c, σ).
Remark 2.1 From the definitions above we know that transition functions
Φ0 and Φ̂0 of a domain description D do not depends on any initial-knowledge
proposition. In other words, if two domain descriptions D1 and D2 contain
the same non initial-knowledge propositions, then their transition functions
coincide.
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A condition plan c is 0-executable in σ if ⊥ 6∈ Φ̂0(c, σ).
Lemma 2.1 (Monotonicity Lemma) Let c be a plan, Σ1,Σ2 be two sets of
a-states. Suppose Σ1  Σ2, and c is 0-executable in every a-state on Σ1.
Then Φ̂0(c,Σ1)  Φ̂0(c,Σ2).
Proof: We proceed by induction on the structure of the plan c.
1. Suppose c consists of only an action a. Consider an arbitrary a-state
σ′2 ∈ Φ0(a,Σ2). Then there is an a-state σ2 = (T2, F2) ∈ Σ2 such that
σ′2 ∈ Φ0(a, σ2). Since Σ1  Σ2, pick σ1 = (T1, F1) ∈ Σ1 such that
σ1  σ2. It is sufficient to show that σ
′
1  σ
′
2 for some σ
′
1 ∈ Φ0(a, σ1).
If a is a non-sensing action a, then the assertion follows directly from
Proposition 2.2. Suppose a is a sensing action. Then σ′2 must be of the
form (T2∪X,F2∪Y ) because a is a sensing action, here X∪Y = K(a).
Then clearly (T1∪X,F1∪Y ) must be in Φ0(a, σ1). The assertion follows
since (T1 ∪X,F1 ∪ Y )  (T2 ∪X,F2 ∪ Y ).
2. Suppose c is case plan case ϕ1 → c1. · · · . ϕk → ck. endcase. Consider
any a-state σ′2 ∈ Φ̂0(c,Σ2). Let σ1 ∈ Σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ2 be such that σ1  σ2
and σ′2 ∈ Φ̂0(c, σ2). Since c is 0-executable in σ1, some ϕi is true in
σ1. Then ϕi is also true in σ2 since σ1  σ2. Then by the induction
hypothesis, Φ̂0(c, σ1) = Φ̂0(ci, σ1)  Φ̂0(ci, σ2) = Φ̂0(c, σ2). Thus, there
is σ′1 ∈ Φ̂0(c,Σ1) such that σ
′
1  σ
′
2. Consequently, Φ0(c,Σ1)  Φ(c,Σ2)
3. Suppose c = c1; c2. By induction hypothesis Φ̂0(c1,Σ1)  Φ̂(c1,Σ2).
Then by the definition of Φ̂0 we have
Φ̂0(c,Σ1) =

 ⋃
σ′∈Φ̂0(c1,Σ1)
Φ̂0(c2, σ
′)

 

 ⋃
σ′′∈Φ̂0(c1,Σ2)
Φ̂0(c2, σ
′′)

 = Φ̂0(c,Σ2)
An a-state σ is called an initial a-state of D if p is true in σ for any fluent
literal p such that the initial-knowledge proposition “initially p” is in D.
Suppose D is a domain description, c is a conditional plan, X is a set of
fluent literals, and p a literals. The semantics for the queries are given below:
9
Definition 2.4 ([24])
• D |=0 Knows X after c if for every initial a-state σ, the plan c is
0-executable in σ, and X is true in every a-state in Φ̂0(c, σ).
• D |=0 Kwhether p after c if for every initial a-state σ, the plan c
is 0-executable in σ, and p is either true or false in every a-state in
Φ̂0(c, σ).
Let TD := {f | “initially f” ∈ D}, FD := {f | “initially ¬f” ∈ D}.
Obviously, (TD, FD) is the least initial a-state of D, that is, (TD, FD)  σ for
any initial a-state σ. The following lemma follows easily from Lemma 2.1.
Lemma 2.2
• D |=0 Knows X after c if and only if the plan c is 0-executable in
(TD, FD), and X true true in every a-state in Φ̂(c, (TD, FD)).
• D |=0 Kwhether p after c if the plan c is 0-executable in (TD, FD),
and p is either true or false in every a-state in Φ̂(c, (TD, FD)).
3 A Proof System for 0-Approximation
A consistent set X of literals determines a unique a-state (TX , FX) by TX :=
{f | f ∈ X} and FX := {f | ¬f ∈ X}. And conversely an a-state determines
uniquely the set S(T,F ) := T ∪ ¬F . Obviously, p ∈ X if and only if p is true
in (TX , FX) for any literal p.
In the following we will not distinguish sets of literals and a-states from
each other. For example, Res0(a,X)) is nothing but Res0(a, (TX , FX)) which
can be regarded as a set of literals. Analogically, we have notations Φ0(c,X)
and Φ̂0(c,X), which can be regarded as collections of sets of literals.
Definition 3.1 Let D be a domain description without initial-knowledge
propositions. Suppose X, Y are two sets of fluent literals. By D |=0 {X}c{Y }
we mean D∪ ini(X) |=0 Knows Y after c. Here ini(X) = {initially p | p ∈
X}.
Remark 3.1
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• The idea of the notation {X}c{Y } comes from programming verifica-
tion where in the sense of total correctness {ϕ}P{ψ} means that any
computation of P starts in a state satisfying ϕ will terminates in a
state satisfying ψ. (see e.g. [1])
• By Lemma 2.2, D |=0 {X}c{Y } if and only if Y is true in every a-state
in Φ̂0(c,X).
Suppose D is a general domain description (that is, initially-knowledge
propositions are allowed). Let D′ be the set of all non-initial-knowledge
propositions of D, and let X := {p | “initially p” is in D}. Then D′ |=0
{X}c{Y } is equivalent to D |=0 Knows Y after c.
3.1 The Proof System PR0D for Knows
In the remainder of this section we fixed a domain description D without
initial-knowledge propositions. We always use X, Y,X ′, Y ′ to denote consis-
tent set of fluent literals. The proof system PR0D consists of the following
groups of axioms and rules 1-6.
AXIOM 1. (Empty)
{X}[ ]{X}.
AXIOM 2. (Non-sensing Action)
{X}a{(Res0(a,X))}.
Where a is a non-sensing action 0-executable in X .
RULE 3. (Sensing Action)
{X ∪X1}c{Y }, · · · , {X ∪Xm}c{Y }
{X}a; c{Y }
.
Where a is a sensing action 0-executable in X , and X1, · · ·Xm are
all sets X ′ of fluent literals such that fln(X ′) = K(a) and X ∪ X ′ is
consistent.
RULE 4. (Case)
ϕi ⊆ X, {X}ci; c
′{Y }
{X}c; c′{Y }
.
Where c is the case plan case ϕ1 → c1. · · ·. ϕm → cm. endcase.
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RULE 5. (Composition)
{X}c1{Y
′}, {Y ′}c2{Y }
{X}c1; c2{Y }
.
RULE 6 (Consequence)
X ′ ⊆ X, {X ′}c{Y ′}, Y ⊆ Y ′
{X}c{Y }
.
Definition 3.2 A proof sequence (or, derivation) of PR0D is a sequence
{X1}c1{Y1}, · · · , {Xn}cn{Yn} such that each {Xi}ci{Yi} is either an axiom
in PR0D or is obtained from some of {X1}c1{Y1}, · · · , {Xi−1}ci−1{Yi−1} by
applying a rule in PR0D.
By D ⊢0 {X}c{Y }, we mean that {X}c{Y } appears in some proof se-
quence of PR0D, that is, {X}c{Y } can be derived from axioms and rules in
PR0D.
Example 3.1 ([24]) Let
D :=


check determines alarm off
defuse causes disarmed if alarm off
defuse causes exploded if ¬alarm off
switch causes ¬alarm off if alarm off
switch causes alarm off if ¬alarm off
executable check if ¬exploded
executable switch if ¬exploded
executable defuse if ¬exploded


Let c′ be the case plan: case ¬alarm off → switch. alarm off → [ ]. endcase,
and c be the plan: check; c′; defuse. Then the following is a proof sequence
of PR0D.
(1) {¬disarmed,¬exploded,¬alarm off}switch{¬disarmed,¬exploded, alarm off}
(AXIOM 2)
(2) {¬disarmed,¬exploded,¬alarm off}c′{¬disarmed,¬exploded, alarm off}
((1) and RULE 4)
(3) {¬disarmed,¬exploded, alarm off}[ ]{¬disarmed,¬exploded, alarm off}
(AXIOM 1)
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(4) {¬disarmed,¬exploded, alarm off}c′{¬disarmed,¬exploded, alarm off}
((3) and RULE 4)
(5) {¬disarmed,¬exploded}check; c′{¬disarmed,¬exploded, alarm off}
((2), (4) and RULE 3)
(6) {¬disarmed,¬exploded, alarm off}defuse{disarmed,¬exploded, alarm off}
(AXIOM 2)
(7) {¬disarmed,¬exploded}c{disarmed,¬exploded, alarm off}
((6) and RULE 5)
Remark 3.2 One important observation is that constructing a proof se-
quence could also be considered as a procedure for generating plans. This
feature is very useful for the agent to do so-called off-line planning [12, 5].
That is, when the agent is free from assigned tasks, she could continuously
compute (short) proofs and store them into a well-maintained database. Such
a database consists of a huge number of proofs of the form {X}c{Y } after
certain amount of time. W.l.o.g., we may assume these proofs are stored into
a graph, where {X}, {Y } are nodes and c is an connecting edge. With such
a database, the agent could do on-line query quickly. Precisely speaking,
asking whether a plan c′ exists for leading state {X ′} to {Y ′}, is equivalent
to look for a path c′ from {X ′} to {Y ′} in the graph. This is known as the
PATH problem and could be easily computed (NL-complete, see [21]).
3.1.1 Soundness of PR0D
Theorem 3.1 (Soundness of PR0D) PR
0
D is sound. That is, for any condi-
tional plan c and any consistent sets X, Y of fluent literals, D ⊢0 {X}c{Y }
implies D |=0 {X}c{Y }.
Proof: Suppose D ⊢0 {X}c{Y }. Then {X}c{Y } has a derivation. We shall
proceed by induction on the length of the derivation. Let Φ0 and Φ̂0 be 0-
transition functions of D. Please note that for any set S of fluent literals, the
0-transition functions of D ∪ ini(S) are the same as Φ0 and Φ̂0, respectively
(see Remark 2.1).
1. Suppose {X}c{Y } is an axiom in AXIOM 1. Then X = Y and c = [ ].
Clearly, D |=0 {X}[ ]{X}.
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2. Suppose {X}c{Y } is an axiom in AXIOM 2, i.e., c consists of only a
non-sensing action a which is 0-executable in X , and Y = Res0(a,X).
Since Φ̂0(a,X) = {Res0(a,X)}, it follows that D |=0 {X}a{Y }.
3. Suppose {X}c{Y } is obtained by applying a rule in RULE 3. Then
c = a; c1 for some sensing action a 0-executable in X , and {X}c{Y } is
obtained from {X ∪X1}c1{Y }, · · · , {X ∪Xm}c1{Y }, where X1, · · ·Xm
are all sets X ′ of fluent literals such that fln(X ′) = K(a) and X ∪ X ′
is consistent. By the induction hypothesis,
D |=0 {X ∪Xi}c1{Y }, for i = 1, · · · , m.
That is, all literals in Y are true in every set in Φ̂0(c1, X ∪Xi). Please
note that Φ0(a,X) = {X ∪X1, · · · , X ∪Xm}. By the definition of Φ̂0
(see Definition 2.3),
Φ̂0(c,X) =
m⋃
i=1
Φ̂0(c1, X ∪X
′
i).
Therefore, D |=0 {X}c{Y }.
4. Suppose {X}c{Y } is obtained by applying a rule in RULE 4. That
is, c is a plan c1; c2, where c1 is a case plan case ϕ1 → c
′
1. · · · . ϕn →
c′n. endcase such that for some i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, ϕi ⊆ X and {X}c
′
i; c2{Y }
has been derived. By the induction hypothesis, we haveD |=0 {X}c
′
i; c2{Y }.
By Definition 2.3, we have Φ̂0(c,X) = Φ̂0(c2, Φ̂0(c1, σ)) = Φ̂0(c2, Φ̂0(c
′
i, X)) =
Φ̂0(c
′
i; c2, X). Then, all literals of Y are true in Φ̂0(c,X). Thus, D |=0
{X}c{Y }.
5. Suppose {X}c{Y } is obtained from {X}c1{Y
′} and {Y ′}c2{Y } by ap-
plying a rule in RULE 5. By the inductive hypothesis,
D |=0 {X}c1{Y
′} and D |=0 {Y
′}c2{Y }.
Then for any S ∈ Φ̂0(c1, X), we have Y
′ ⊆ S (i.e., (TY ′, FY ′) 
(TS, FS)). Thus, by Lemma 2.1, Φ̂0(c2, Y
′)  Φ̂0(c2, S). Then
Φ̂0(c2, Y
′) 

 ⋃
S∈Φ̂0(c1,X)
Φ̂0(c2, S)

 = Φ̂0(c,X),
It follows that D |=0 {X}c{Y }.
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6. Suppose {X}c{Y } is obtained by applying a rule in RULE 6. That is,
there is X ′ ⊆ X and Y ′ ⊇ Y such that {X ′}c{Y ′} has been derived.
Then by the induction hypothesis, all literals in Y ′ is known to be true
in Φ̂0(c,X
′), so are literals in Y . By Lemma 2.1 we have Φ̂0(c,X
′) 
Φ̂0(c,X). Therefore, D |=0 {X}c{Y }.
Altogether, we complete the proof.
3.1.2 Completeness of PR0D
Theorem 3.2 (Completeness of PR0D) PR
0
D is complete. That is, for any
conditional plan c and any consistent sets X, Y of fluent literals, D |=0
{X}c{Y } implies D ⊢0 {X}c{Y }.
Proof: Suppose D |=0 {X}c{Y }. We shall show D ⊢0 {X}c{Y }. We shall
proceed by induction on the structure of c.
1. Suppose c consists of only an action a. Then a is 0-executable in X .
• Case 1. a is a non-sensing action. Then all literals in Y are
true in Res0(a,X), that is, Y ⊆ Res0(a,X). By Axiom 2, D ⊢0
{X}a{Res0(a,X)}. Then by RULE 6, we obtain D ⊢0 {X}a{Y }.
• Case 2. a is a sensing action. Consider any p ∈ Y . We shall show
p ∈ X . Suppose otherwise, then X ′ := X∪{¬p} is still consistent.
Then Φ0(a,X)  Φ0(a,X
′). Thus p should also be true in every
a-state in Φ0(a,X
′). On the other hand, ¬p is true in every a-
state in Φ0(a,X
′) since ¬p ∈ X ′. This is a contradiction. Thus
Y ⊆ X . Then for any set X ′ such that fln(X ′) = K(a) and X∪X ′
is consistent, we have D ⊢0 {X ∪X
′}[ ]{Y }. Now applying RULE
3 we obtain D ⊢0 {X}a{Y }.
2. Suppose c is a case plan case ϕ1 → c1. · · · . ϕm → cm. endcase. Since
D |=0 {X}c{Y }, it follows that ϕi ⊆ X for some i (otherwise, c would
not be 0-executable in X). Then D |=0 {X}ci{Y }. By the induction
hypothesis, D ⊢0 {X}ci{Y }. By RULE 4 we have D ⊢0 {X}c{Y }.
3. Suppose c is a composition plan c1; c2. We shall show the assertion by
induction on the structure of c1.
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• c1 is a non-sensing action a. By Definition 2.3, Φ̂0(a; c2, X) =
Φ̂0(c2,Res0(a,X)). By the induction hypothesis, D ⊢0 {Res0(a,X)}c2{Y }.
By AXIOM 2 and RULE 5, we obtain D ⊢0 {X}c{Y }.
• c1 is a sensing action a. Consider any X
′ such that fln(X ′) = K(a)
and X ∪ X ′ is consistent. Since D |=0 {X}a; c2{Y }, it follows
D |=0 {X ∪X
′}c2{Y }. Then by the induction hypothesis we have
D ⊢0 {X ∪X
′}c2{Y }. By RULE 3 we obtain D ⊢0 {X}a; c2{Y }.
• c is a case plan case ϕ1 → c
′
1. · · · . ϕm → c
′
m. endcase. Since c is
0-executable in X , it follows that ϕi ⊆ X for some i. Then D |=0
{X}c′i; c2{Y }. By the induction hypothesis. D ⊢0 {X}c
′
i; c2{Y }.
By RULE 4 we have D ⊢0 {X}c1; c2{Y }.
• c1 is c
′
1; c
′′
1 such that c
′ and c′′ are not empty. Then c is c′1; (c
′′
1; c2).
Now c′1 is shorter. By the induction hypothesis, D ⊢0 {X}c{Y }.
Altogether, we complete the proof.
3.2 The Proof System PRKW0D for Knows-Whether
In this section we shall construct a proof system for reasoning aboutKwhether
p after c (here p is a fluent literal). We also fix an arbitrary domain de-
scription D without initial knowledge-propositions. Similar to the notation
{X}c{Y }, we introduce notation {X}c{KWp}.
Definition 3.3 Let c be a plan, X be a consistent set of fluent literals, and
p a fluent literal. By D |=0 {X}c{KWp} we mean
D ∪ ini(X) |=0 Kwhether p after c.
Proof system PRKW0D consists of axioms and rules of groups 1-6 in Sec-
tion 3.1 and the following groups 7-12.
AXIOM 7.
{X}a{KWf}
Where a is a sensing action 0-executable in X , and f is a fluent name
such that the k-proposition “a determines f” belongs to D.
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RULE 8.
{X}c{{p}}
{X}c{KWp}
RULE 9.
{X}c{KWp}
{X}c{KW¬p}
RULE 10. (Sensing Action)
{X ∪X1}c{KWp}, · · · , {X ∪Xm}c{KWp}
{X}a; c{KWp}
.
Where a is a sensing action 0-executable in X , and X1, · · ·Xm are
all sets X ′ of fluent literals such that fln(X ′) = K(a) and X ∪ X ′ is
consistent.
RULE 11. (Composition)
{X}c1{Y }, {Y }c2{KWp}
{X}c1; c2{KWp}
RULE 12. (Case)
ϕi ⊆ X, {X}ci; c
′{KWp}
{X}c; c′{KWp}
.
Where c is the case plan case ϕ1 → c1. · · · . ϕn → cn. endcase.
Definition 3.4 (Proof Sequence of PRKW0D) A Proof sequence (or, deriva-
tion) of PRKW0D is a sequence of elements with the form {S1}c1{T} or
{S}c{KWp} such that each element is either an axiom in PRKW0D or is
obtained from some of previous elements by applying a rule in PRWK0D.
By D ⊢0 {S}c{KWp}, we mean that {S}c{KWp} appears in some proof
sequence of PRKW0D, that is {S}c{KWp} can be derived from axioms and
rules in PRKW0D.
Remark 3.3 Please note that {X}c{KWp} never appears as a premise in a
rule with consequence of the form {X ′}c′{Y ′}. Thus, {X}c{Y } is derivable
in PRKW0D if and only if it is derivable in PR
0
D. So, for derivability of
{X}c{Y } in PRKW0D, we still employ the notation D ⊢0 {X}c{Y }.
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Theorem 3.3 (soundness of PRKW0D) Given a plan c, thenD ⊢0 {X}c{KWp}
implies D |=0 {X}c{KWp} for any consistent set X of fluent literals, and
any fluent literal p.
Proof: We can show this theorem by induction on the length of deriva-
tions. By the soundness of PR0D, there are six cases according to whether
{S}c{KWp} is an axiom in AXIOM 7 or obtained by applying a rule in group
8-12. For each case, the proof is easy. We omit the proof.
Theorem 3.4 (completeness of PRKW0D) Given a plan c, then D |=0 {X}c{KWp}
implies D ⊢0 {X}c{KWp} for any consistent set X of fluent literals, and any
fluent literal p.
Proof: We proceed by induction on the structure of c. Suppose D |=0
{X}c{KWp}.
1. c is empty. Then it must be that p ∈ X or ¬p ∈ X . Then {X}[ ]{{p}}
or {X}[ ]{{¬p}} is derivable. Then by RULE 8-9 we can derive {X}[ ]{KWp}.
2. c consists of only a sensing action a. Then a is 0-executable in X .
If p ∈ X , it is clearly that {X}a{{p}} is derivable. From RULE 8
we derive {X}a{KWp}. By the same argument, if ¬p ∈ X , then
D ⊢0 {X}a{KW¬p}, and then we can derive {X}a{KWp} by applying
RULE 9. Now we suppose neither p nor ¬p is in X . We claim that
the k-proposition “a determines fln(p)” belongs to D (Otherwise, p
and ¬p would remain unknown in every a-state in Φ0(a,X). This
contradicts the assumption D |=0 {X}a{KWp}). Now we have an
axiom {X}a{KW fln(p)}. If p itself is a fluent name then we are down,
else we derive {X}c{KWp} by applying RULE 9.
3. c consists of only a non-sensing action a. Since D |=0 {X}a{KWp}, it
follows that a is 0-executable X and either p or ¬p is true in Res0(a,X).
That is, p ∈ Res(a,X) or ¬p ∈ Res(a,X). SinceD ⊢0 {X}a{Res(a,X)},
we haveD ⊢0 {X}a{{p}} orD ⊢0 {X}a{{¬p}}. Then either {X}a{KWp}
or {X}a{KW¬p} can be derived by applying RULE 8. If {X}a{KW¬p}
is derivable then we obtain {X}a{KWp} by applying RULE 9.
4. c is a case plan of the form case ϕ1 → c1. · · · . ϕ → cn. endcase.
Then there must be some i ∈ {1, · · · , n} such that ϕi ⊆ X . Otherwise,
c would not be 0-executable. Then we can see thatD |=0 {X}ci{KWp}.
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By the induction hypothesis, we have D ⊢0 {X}ci{KWp}. Then we
can derive {X}c{KWp} by RULE 12.
5. Suppose c = c1; c2 such that c1and c2 are non-empty. We show D ⊢0
{X}c{KWp} by induction on the structure of c1.
• c1 is a sensing action a. Let X1, · · ·Xm be all sets X
′ of flu-
ent literals such that fln(X ′) = K(a) and X ∪ X ′ is consistent.
Consider an arbitrary Xi. We have D |=0 {X ∪ Xi}c2{KWp}
since Φ̂0(c2, X ∪ Xi) ⊆ Φ̂0(a; c2, X). By the induction hypothe-
sis, D ⊢0 {X ∪ Xi}c2{KWp}. Now by RULE 10 we can derive
{X}a; c2{KWp}.
• c1 is a non-sensing action a. Then a is 0-executable in X . Since
Φ̂0(c2,Res0(a,X)) = Φ̂0(a; c2, X), it follows thatD |=0 {Res0(a,X)}c2{KWp}.
By the induction hypothesis, {Res(a,X)}c2{KWp} is derivable.
Please note that {X}a{Res(a,X)} is an axiom in AXIOM 2. By
RULE 11, we can derive {X}a; c2{KWp}.
• c1 is a case plan case ϕ1 → c
′
1. · · · . ϕn → c
′
n. endcase. We
know that ϕi ⊆ X for some i ∈ {1, · · · , n}. It follows that D |=0
{X}c′i; c2{KWp} since we have assumed D |=0 {X}c1; c2{KWp}.
By the induction hypothesis, D ⊢0 {S}c
′
i; c2{KWp}. Now apply-
ing RULE 12 we can derive {X}c1; c2{KWp}.
• c1 = c
′
1; c
′
2 such that c
′
1, c
′
2 are not empty plan. Then c = c
′
1; (c
′
2; c2).
Now c′1 is shorter. Then {X}c{KWp} is derivable by the induction
hypothesis.
Altogether, we complete the proof.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a proof system for plan verification under
0-approximation semantics introduced in [24]. The proof system has the
following advantages: it is self-contained, hence it does not rely on any par-
ticular logic, and need not to pay extra costs to the process of translation; it
could be used for both plan verification or plan generation. Particularly, we
would like to point out that proof system based inference approach possesses
a very desirable property for off-line planning. Simply speaking, it allows
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the agent to produce and store (shorter) proofs into a database in spare time,
and perform quick on-line planning by constructing requested proofs from
the (shorter) proofs in the database.
Please note that the construction of the proof systems PRKW0D depends
essentially on the monotonicity property of Φ0 (see Lemma 2.1). According
to [24], an action a is 1-executable in an a-state σ if it is 0-executable in every
complete a-state extending σ. And if a non-sensing action a is 1-executable
in σ, then Res1(a, σ) is defined as the intersection of all Res0(a, σ
′), σ′ ∈
Comp(σ) which is the set of all complete a-states extending σ. Obviously,
Res1 is monotonic, that is, if σ  δ then Res1(a, σ)  Res1(a, δ). Thus
the transition function Φ1 and Φ̂1 (for precise definition please see [24]) are
also monotonic. Therefore, in PRKW0D, if we replace {X}a{Res0(a,X)} in
AXIOM 2 by {X}a{Res1(a,X)}, and replace in all groups “0-executable” by
“1-executable”, we will obtain a sound and complete proof system PRKW1D
for plan verification under 1-approximation. Please note, however, since 1-
exeutability is unlikely solvable in poly-time, to determine whether a rule in
PRKW1D is applicable seems intractable.
The work of Matteo Baldoni et al [2] is closely related to our idea. They
proposed a modal logic approach for reasoning about sensing actions, to-
gether with goal directed proof procedure for generating conditional plans.
The states of a world are represented in [2] as three valued models, so queries
about Knows-Whether are not supported. Moreover, their approach does not
provide reasoning about case plan, and the completeness of their proof pro-
cedure is unknown.
In the future, we shall further work on proof system for more powerful
action logics. We shall consider the implementation of the proposed proof
systems on top of Coq [10] or Tableaux [8], and try to find applications in
knowledge representation and reasoning.
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